Jessica Tracy

Psychologists define greed as a desire to acquire more and the dissatisfaction of never having enough (Seuntjens et al., 2015a), but studies have not examined the psychological processes that underlie and sustain this disposition. We propose that a desire to attain pride might be one emotional mechanism that promotes greedy acquisition. In this account, greedy people experience a boost of pride from acquisition but these feelings are short lived, potentially leading to the perpetual acquisitiveness characteristic of dispositional greed. In the present dissertation, I test this theoretical model, as well as its boundary conditions and implications, in 14 studies. These studies also show that the relationship between greed and pride is robust to controlling for other positive emotions, suggesting that feeling pride upon acquisition is the distinguishing factor between the emotional experience of greedy and less greedy people in this situation. In addition, I demonstrate that greedy people’s pervasive acquisitiveness cannot be explained by a deficit in affective forecasting compared to people low in greed. I also test the boundary conditions of this process finding, for example, that greedy people feel equivalent pride boosts in acquisitions received as gifts compared with those they purchase for themselves and that greedy people do not show the same pattern of pride responses to personal achievements. Finally, I summarize the findings, compare them to other models of related traits in the field, and discuss the implications and future directions of this research. Together, this dissertation proposes and tests a theoretical model that might help explain greedy people’s defining characteristic, pervasive acquisitiveness, by demonstrating how acquisition foments intense, yet ephemeral, emotional benefits for greedy people.

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Facial structure and facial expressions play a crucial role in the communication of social information, but faces are rarely perceived in isolation. Instead, observers view faces as they rest upon their physical foundation: the head. Here, I argue that head position plays a critical role in face perception by causing the appearance of the eyebrows to change— paralleling the consequences of facial expressions— without using facial musculature. As a result, although tilting the head does not involve the activation of facial muscles, it may function as an imposter of facial muscle action by changing the appearance of the face. In the present dissertation, I test and support this broad account, and demonstrate its widespread generalizability, across 16 studies. First, in Chapter 2, I (a) provide evidence that a downwards head tilt increases perceptions of dominance, (b) demonstrate that this effect occurs by changing the apparent V-shape of the eyebrows, in particular, and (c) rule out the possibility that any of the other previously proposed mechanisms are viable explanations for observed effects. In Chapter 3, I test whether the AU imposter mechanism is likely to be a universal feature of human visual cognition, by assessing its impact on social perceptions among the Mayangna – members of an unindustrialized small-scale traditional society who have minimal exposure to North American culture. In Chapters 4 and 5 I demonstrate that the AU imposter mechanism systematically influences social perceptions of emotionally expressive faces, alongside neutral faces – including perceptions formed from expressions of anger (Chapter 4) and happiness (Chapter 5). Finally, in Chapter 6 I review the existing body of evidence in support of the AU imposter mechanism, outline theoretical and applied implications of the AU imposter, and provide avenues for future inquiry. Together, these six chapters outline how and why the head should be considered a platform for universally communicating salient interpersonal information via the face, and one that can drastically alter, and in some cases categorically change, the message communicated from both neutral and expressive faces.

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Social and personality psychologists strive toward theory advancement—or the derivation of truthful and applicable statements about human behavior—while often neglecting the methods that support those theoretical conclusions. In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I discuss a two-stage process outlining how researchers’ measurement decisions are inextricably linked to the theoretical conclusions drawn from individual studies. Stage 1 involves formulating an initial definition and measurement tool for a construct, and Stage 2 involves placing this construct within a nomological network of other constructs. Stage 2 is typically followed by iteration back to Stage 1, when the construct is re-formulated based on the findings from Stage 2. In Chapters 2 and 3, I use this two-stage process as a lens through which to analyze individual constructs of humility and happiness, describing research that constitutes a second iteration through Stage 1 of the measurement-theory cycle. In Chapter 2, I propose a revised definition of humility, showing that humility consists of two dimensions (appreciative and self-abasing humility), whereas prior formulations have measured only one dimension mirroring appreciative humility. In Chapter 3, I propose a revised definition of happiness in the context of discretionary spending on experiential and material purchases, demonstrating that explicitly measuring momentary happiness portrays material things in a more favorable light than has prior work which has measured afterglow happiness. In Chapter 4, I use the two-stage process as a lens through which to analyze the field of subjectively experienced distinct positive emotions, describing research that constitutes a second iteration through Stage 1 of the measurement-theory cycle and a second foray into Stage 2. Specifically, I construct bottom-up definitions and measurement tools for each positive emotion currently studied in the literature based on lay experience, and present the interrelations among these emotions. In Chapter 5, I reflect on lessons learned by comparing a wide range of literatures through the lens of the measurement-theory cycle, and I outline an agenda for the field of distinct positive emotions, which would build on the work presented in Chapter 4 and progress toward the ultimate goal of constructing a universal taxonomy of basic positive emotions.

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During the cognitive revolution, moral judgment was seen as primarily caused by conscious language-based reasoning. At the start of the twenty-first century, a new science of morality arose, which suggested that automatic intuitions primarily cause moral judgments. More recent research has called into question the evidence for intuitive morality, supporting the possibility that conscious reasoning is critical for generating moral judgments. The aim of my dissertation is to examine the importance of intuition versus language-based reasoning for generating moral judgments. To do so, I tested a) whether interfering with the primary physiological component of disgust has causal consequences for moral judgments and b), in a split-brain patient, whether processes in the language-dominant left hemisphere are critical for generating moral judgments.More specifically, I tested whether disgust is causally related to moral judgments. To do so, I pharmacologically inhibited disgust responses to moral infractions and examined effects on moral thinking. Findings demonstrated that the antiemetic ginger (Zingiber officinale), known to inhibit nausea, reduces feelings of disgust toward non-moral purity-offending stimuli (e.g., bodily fluids), providing evidence that disgust is causally rooted in physiological nausea (Study 1; Study 5 ruled out an alternative explanation for this effect). This same physiological experience was causally related to moral thinking: ginger reduced judgment severity toward purity-based moral violations (Study 3) and eliminated the tendency for people higher in bodily sensation awareness to make harsher moral judgments (Study 4). Effects were consistently restricted to moderately severe stimuli and to purity offending stimuli: ginger had no effects on harm-based judgments (Studies 2 and 6). Together, findings provide the first evidence that disgust can be disrupted by an antiemetic and that doing so has consequences for purity-based moral judgments.Next, I examined in split-brain patient J.W. whether the right hemisphere, preferential for processing an agent’s intentions, can make typical moral judgments when informationally disconnected from the language-dominant left. I found that processes in the language dominant left hemisphere are not critical for the right hemisphere to generate adult-typical intent-based moral judgments (Study 7).Overall, findings provide renewed support for the importance of intuitive processes in generating moral judgments.

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According to the biological principles of life history theory, there is a fundamental trade-off between mating effort and parenting effort. The five studies reported here (N = 3,439) tested two conceptually distinct ways in which that trade-off might manifest at a psychological level of analysis. Studies 1 and 2 focus on developmental processes and individual differences in the chronic activation of the mate acquisition and parenting motivational systems. Studies 3, 4, and 5 focus on temporary activation and inhibition of the mate acquisition and parenting motivational systems. The primary results of Study 1 (n = 305) suggest that men who express a greater desire to engage in short-term mating behavior have a less intense nurturant parental response to infants; Study 2 (n = 2252) revealed similar inverse relations, this time among both men and women (as well as parents and nonparents). Study 2 additionally noted a positive correlation between short-term mating orientation and chronic protective parental tendencies. Results from Study 3 (n = 92) indicate that the temporary arousal of a parental care-giving motivational state consequently inhibits self-reported inclinations toward short-term mating; this effect was only found in women. Results from Studies 4 (n = 308) and 5 (n = 482) suggest that temporary arousal of a mate acquisition motivational state consequently inhibits self-reported tender emotional responses towards infants. No consistent sex differences were noted in this latter result. Results of Study 5 additionally suggest that the temporary arousal of a disease- and predator-avoidance motivational states consequently inhibit self-reported nurturant emotional responses towards infants as well. No consistent sex differences were noted in these effects. Taken together, the present research yields results consistent with hypothesized psychological manifestations of the mating/parenting trade-off. But the present research also yields additional results that pose a challenge to these seemingly straightforward hypotheses, suggesting that a more nuanced approach must be taken to understand how the mating/parenting trade-off might manifest psychologically.

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Humans learn a great deal by copying knowledgeable others, but how do individuals determine which social group members have knowledge that should be copied? I argue that the pride nonverbal expression functions to signal expertise and knowledge, and thus to bias learning such that proud others are more likely to be copied. In Study 1, I tested, and found support, for an automatic association between pride displays and knowledge. In Studies 2 and 3, I used different methods to establish the existence of a pride learning bias, which is motivated by a heightened desire for knowledge. That is, I found that pride-displaying confederates are copied significantly more frequently than those displaying other expressions, and that this occurs only when learners are financially motivated to find correct responses, suggesting that pride expressions bias social learning in a functional manner. Study 4 showed that this tendency to copy pride-displaying others transfers to other domains than the domain where pride was originally displayed, suggesting that the expertise of the individual displaying pride generalizes to other areas. In Study 5, I tested the universality of this bias by exploring whether Fijians in a small-scale traditional society demonstrated it; results were inconclusive. In Studies 6 and 7, I tested the automaticity of the bias, and found that participants do not need to be aware of having viewed pride displays in order to show preferential copying behavior (Study 6); however, these results might be due to an automatic bias to attune to positively valenced expressions, rather to pride in particular. Similarly, results were inconclusive regarding whether the pride learning bias occurs efficiently, without the need for working memory (Study 7). Finally, I performed two meta-analyses on the data collected in Studies 2A and 3-7, which supported my earlier conclusions. Together, the findings indicate that pride displays are functional for observers and play a critical role in social learning, and begin to shed light on the nature of this mechanism.

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The pursuit of social rank is a recurrent and pervasive challenge faced by individuals in all human societies. Yet, the precise means through which individuals compete for social standing remains unclear. Chapters 2 and 3 addressed this question and examined the impact of two fundamental strategies—Dominance (the use of force and intimidation to induce fear) and Prestige (the sharing of expertise or know-how to gain respect)—on the attainment of social rank, among a group of individuals who interacted over a collaborative group task. Consistent with this theoretical framework, the adoption of either a Dominance or Prestige strategy promoted perceptions of greater influence as rated by both group members and outside observers, higher levels of actual impact over the group’s decision-making (Chapter 2), and increased visual attention from observers whose gaze was monitored with an eye-tracking device (Chapter 3). Subsequent studies explored the ethological underpinnings of these rank-attaining strategies by examining the verbal styles and nonverbal behaviors displayed by Dominant and Prestigious individuals during the group interactions. Detailed behavioral coding revealed that whereas Dominance was signaled through intimidating and self-entitling verbal styles and spatially expansive and aggressive postural displays, Prestige was signaled through socially attractive and self-deprecating verbal styles and confidence-signaling nonverbal movements (Chapters 4-5). Furthermore, Dominant individuals signaled their formidability by lowering their vocal pitch during the initial minutes of the group interaction (Chapter 6). In contrast, Prestige was not systematically associated with alterations in pitch. Collectively, these studies demonstrate that Dominance and Prestige are independent yet both viable strategies for ascending the social hierarchy, and are each underpinned by distinct, theoretically predictable patterns of verbal styles and nonverbal behaviors.

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