Relevant Degree Programs
Graduate Student Supervision
Doctoral Student Supervision (Jan 2008 - Nov 2019)
The full abstract for this thesis is available in the body of the thesis, and will be available when the embargo expires.
In contrast to existing geopolitical, diplomatic and financial studies, this dissertation applies the tools of cultural history to investigate the genesis of the 1894 Franco-Russian alliance, from the French perspective. Drawing on a broad range of sources spanning the textual, audiovisual and material domains - many hitherto unexplored - it argues that after France's humiliating 1871 defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, a significant cadre of extra-governmental actors began to promote and enable the move by the early Third Republic to forge an alliance with Russia, considered by many to be an improbable ally. These actors engineered a radical reframing of attitudes towards Russia between 1871 and 1901, despite the substantial obstacles of diametrically opposed governments, entrenched stereotypes stemming from Napoléon's 1812 invasion of Russia and the Crimean War of 1854-1856, and French Catholic antipathy towards Russian repression of the uprisings in Poland in 1830 and in 1863. To forge an alliance, considerable geopolitical amnesia would be required; a new "politics of imagination" would be necessary, with a politics of persuasion to set it in place. Spurred by chronic government instability and the lack of directional foreign policy as the new Republic struggled to achieve its political equilibrium, and enabled by the evolving social, cultural and political structures that it unleashed, pro-alliance actors exemplified an engaged polity whose efforts targeted both the government and the public as they disseminated positive representations to present Russia as a worthy partner for France. Operating within the academic, literary, publishing, lobbyist, financial, entertainment, entrepreneurial and religious spheres, they worked either to counter anti-Russian tropes, to facilitate French loans to Russia as an inducement to alliance, to promote an alliance agenda, or to harness alliance popularity to their domestic social agendas. Above all, to enable the goals of "popular diplomacy" and inclusionary politics, pro-alliance elites employed a vast range of traditional and new mass media. Contributing to government decision-making and to wider public opinion, their actions demonstrated the intersection of domestic politics with foreign policy decisions, while helping to shape the political culture of the early Third Republic.